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Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?

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Abstract: The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, . . . In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others' wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.

The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince . . . In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests.¹ Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others' wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others

1 act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to
2 forbid).

3 In this paper, I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence
4 cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian
5 framework. I first claim that the account of subjection we find in *Force and*
6 *Freedom* presupposes rather than explains why the actions it singles out are
7 enforceably wrong. I then go on to show that, on a revised understanding of
8 subjection that deals with this problem, the Ripstein–Kant view still would not
9 be able to generate a determinate and plausible way of distinguishing basic cases
10 of subjection from basic cases of mere influence. My conclusion will be that, in
11 trying to distinguish such cases, the Kant–Ripstein view must point to ideas *other*
12 *than* independence or subjection.

13 The innate right to freedom under universal law—to ‘independence from
14 being constrained by another’s choice’—is the load-bearing foundation on which
15 the entire Kantian edifice is erected: ‘The idea of independence carries the
16 justificatory burden of the entire argument, from the prohibition of personal
17 injury, through the minutiae of property and contract law, on to the details of the
18 constitutional separation of powers’ (Ripstein 2009: 14; see also p. 31). Kant’s
19 theory (and by extension Ripstein’s reconstruction) is therefore extraordinarily
20 ambitious: all actions that are enforceably wrong are wrong just when and
21 because they violate other people’s independence. Can an entire system of
22 enforceable moral rights, both public and private, be grounded in the single,
23 simple idea of independence? I will argue that it cannot be; an intuitively
24 plausible account of the rights we have requires appeal to concepts other than
25 independence or subjection.

26 The innate right to freedom under universal law governs interaction among
27 persons as purposive and embodied beings, and abstracts from questions
28 regarding the means (other than the body) that persons use to set and pursue
29 ends. The latter are dealt with by extending the universal principle of right (of
30 which the innate right to freedom is a corollary) to other (non-bodily) means
31 we use to pursue ends, such as property and contract. In this paper, I shall
32 focus on innate right and leave acquired rights to the side. Because the argu-
33 ments for the existence and limits of acquired right depend on the success of
34 the argument for innate right, a problem in the latter will infect the former as
35 well.

36 To bring out the need for a distinction between *subjecting* and *affecting*
37 someone’s choices, consider these two examples. I walk down the seaside cliffs
38 and see you in my favorite place, basking in the sun. Since you are there, I can’t
39 take my usual place. Have you subjected me to your choices? No, Ripstein says,
40 I have at most *affected* the context or background against which I make my own
41 choices, making it more difficult for me to achieve ends that I otherwise would
42 have been able to achieve in your absence, but not *subjected* my choices in any
43 relevant sense. I employ a very efficient production process that allows me to
44 produce widgets much more cheaply than you, which foreseeably leads you, my
45 competitor, to go out of business. A similar thing can be said here: By employing

1 the more efficient process, I merely affect the background in which you act; I do
2 not subject your choices to mine (even though I know you will go out of
3 business, and may even intend to put you out of business by using the more
4 efficient process). According to Ripstein, the distinction between affecting and
5 subjecting others' choices is 'central to Kant's argument' (ibid.: 39). But now the
6 question arises: How do we determine which actions lie on one side of the
7 distinction and which on the other? Put another way: what are the criteria for
8 determining which uses of one's means (including one's body) count as sub-
9 jecting others' choices, and which ones count as merely affecting them?

10 It is somewhat striking that there is no sustained discussion of the concept of
11 'subjection' in *Force and Freedom*. At the crucial point where Ripstein introduces
12 the innate right to freedom under universal law, he analyses the notion of
13 subjection in terms of actions that either *usurp* or *destroy* your powers to set ends.
14 Agents *usurp* your powers when they, for example, coerce you or physically force
15 you to do something, and they *destroy* your ability when they, for example, kill
16 or maim you. I take it that in both cases Ripstein means that an agent A usurps
17 or destroys a person B's powers *in such a way as to subject their choices* only when
18 they do so in a reasonably foreseeable and avoidable way (though not neces-
19 sarily intentionally).² Otherwise, when I maim you by falling by accident from
20 a building onto your arm, I have violated your right to freedom by subjecting
21 your choices, which would make my act (absurdly) wrong.

22 The trouble is that 'usurp' is a moralized concept: to usurp means to
23 *illegitimately* take over a power or jurisdiction, or, alternatively, to take over a
24 power or jurisdiction that is *rightfully* someone else's. A moment's reflection
25 should reveal that to moralize the notion of subjection in this way would spell
26 disaster for the Kantian view. Recall: for Kant–Ripstein,

27 an action is enforceably wrong just when and because it subjects others'
28 choices.

29 If we substitute, 'illegitimately take over another's power or take over a power
30 that is rightfully another's' for 'subjection' (and hence leave aside for the
31 moment the other way in which we can subject others' powers, namely by
32 destroying them), we get:

33 an action is enforceably wrong just when and because it illegitimately
34 takes over another's powers or takes over a power that is rightfully
35 another's.

36 That formulation squarely begs the question, saying little more than: an action
37 is wrong just when and because it is wrong (i.e., 'illegitimate'). But what we
38 want to know is *when* 'taking control of another's powers' is illegitimate; what
39 we want to know is *which* 'powers' or 'means' rightfully count as another's.
40 Indeed, the same problem potentially affects the idea of *destroying* another's
41 powers: if I foreseeably and avoidably kill you in self-defence, have I wronged
42 you?³ It is tempting to say that your freedom is only violated when I *illegitimately*
43 destroy your powers, but then the account never really gets off the ground.

1 So we need to find a notion of subjection that *explains why* rather than
2 *presupposes that* the actions it singles out are wrong. Given Ripstein's nod to the
3 republican tradition, and the similar emphasis on independence, a modified
4 version of Pettit's account of nondomination might seem to be just the ticket. On
5 that account, I subject you to my choices, if and only if, and because, I have the
6 unhindered capacity to interfere with your choices on an arbitrary basis, and the
7 mere presence or active exercise of the capacity raises the probability that you
8 will behave in ways you otherwise would not have behaved.⁴ I have an
9 unhindered capacity to *interfere* with your choices, in turn, when I can foresee-
10 ably and avoidably get you to do things by making things worse for you.⁵ While
11 I can get you to do things by making an offer, offers make your situation *better*,
12 and so do not count as forms of interference, and hence do not restrict your
13 freedom. (So in the terms introduced above, offers only *affect* without *subjecting*
14 your choices.) On this view, various forms of manipulation, deception, coercion,
15 and force all count as forms of interference. Finally, my capacity is *unhindered*
16 when no third party can reliably prevent me from interfering with you in this
17 way.

18 For Pettit, my unhindered capacity to interfere with your choices is not
19 sufficient to count as subjecting you to my choices. I must, in addition, be able
20 to interfere with your choices on an *arbitrary* basis. If I interfere with your choices
21 in ways that predictably and reliably 'track your interests', according to Pettit,
22 then I do not dominate you. The 'arbitrariness' condition is a promising addition,
23 especially insofar as it distinguishes republican from so-called negative views of
24 freedom, where any interference, expected or actual, counts as restricting
25 freedom, whether it reliably and predictably tracks our interests or not.⁶ But it,
26 too, faces the same hurdle which we have just set, which becomes apparent
27 when we ask: What count as actions that are 'in our interests'? For example, if
28 I am thrown in jail after a fair trial establishing that I have maimed someone
29 (whom I have, in fact, maimed), do I count as suffering domination at the hands
30 of the state? If we construe an 'interest' as something that will make my life go
31 better, then the answer is clearly yes. But this admission should be unwelcome,
32 because it would mean that the state wronged me in throwing me in jail, since
33 it failed to reliably and predictably track my interests. If, on the other hand, we
34 construe an interest as something that would make a *reasonable* person's life go
35 better (or make people's lives *generally* better), we could then say that any
36 reasonable person has an interest in the protection of their bodily integrity, which
37 the state is 'tracking' in throwing me in jail. This move would come, however,
38 at a significant cost, since the notion of a reasonable person or general interest
39 is clearly moralized in the same way as 'usurp' was above: why should I, the
40 criminal, care what the interests of a 'reasonable person' are, or what 'general
41 interests' people have? The only reason I might have to care is if the interests of
42 others should have (moral) weight in judging what is in my individual interest.

43 Our remarks so far are not yet conclusive against *Ripstein*.⁷ Ripstein need only
44 drop the 'arbitrariness' condition, and refer to the difference between the
45 *enforcement* and *content* of our innate rights. On that modified view, I subject you

1 to my choices, if and only if, and because, I have the unhindered capacity to
2 *unilaterally* interfere with your choices. My unilateral, unauthorized use of force
3 against you is wrong, on this view, because it assumes that my rational
4 agency—an agency I share with you—is uniquely authoritative (and certainly
5 more authoritative than yours). But what about the maiming case? Here Ripstein
6 could say that both cases involve the *omnilateral* application of laws in a civil
7 condition, rather than the *unilateral* subjection of my choices to yours, to which
8 the (modified) definition of subjection refers. So when the state throws me in jail,
9 it coerces me, but it does not wrong me, because it is acting to *restore* and *preserve*
10 an equal system of freedom. The system of rights protecting those freedoms, in
11 turn, are established by the determining the class of relations in which either
12 (a) I have the unhindered capacity to unilaterally interfere with your choices,
13 and the mere presence or active exercise of the capacity raises the probability
14 that you will behave in ways you otherwise would not have behaved, or (b) I
15 have the unhindered capacity to unilaterally destroy your ability to set ends.
16 On this view, my maiming you clearly violates your innate right in this sense
17 (since it counts as a significant unilateral interference that destroys your abili-
18 ties), but not the state's punishment of the crime (which only aims, via an
19 omnilateral authorization, to restore and preserve the system of rights that I have
20 violated).

21 So far we have shown that Ripstein's account might be better placed than
22 Pettit's as an account of a political morality grounded in a basic right to freedom,
23 but is it ultimately successful? I now want to argue that it would still fail, even
24 with the refinements adumbrated in the previous paragraph. To set the stage,
25 consider this set of examples,⁸ which have nothing to do with the state or
26 omnilateral authorization.

27 You can take either the long or the short road to the meadow. You would
28 much rather take the short route, and would do so were it not for the following
29 considerations:

30 **Case 1:** You know that, if you take the short road, I will stop you on the
31 way and bombard you with questions regarding travel details to Cam-
32 bodia, which you'll feel obliged to answer. The prospects of becoming
33 entangled in conversation are sufficiently bleak to make you take the
34 long route instead.

35 **Case 2:** You know that I will be perched at a café alongside the (short)
36 road, hoping to stare at your voluptuous beauty as you walk by. Even
37 though you know I will not attack or assault you, you don't want to feel
38 my eyes on you, so you take the long route.

39 **Case 3:** You know that I will be positioned at a café alongside the (short)
40 road, ready to take pictures of you for my private collection of portraits.
41 You don't want to be photographed, so you take the long route.

42 **Case 4:** You know that I will be hovering on a rooftop along the (short)
43 road, ready to throw a big bucket of cold water over you as you pass by

1 (I'm an inveterate and obnoxious prankster). You don't want to be
2 drenched, so you take the long route.

3 **Case 5:** You know that I will break your kneecaps as you alight onto the
4 short road. You take the long route.

5 In Cases 1, 2 and possibly 3, we want to say that my potentially stopping,
6 looking, and photographing you merely *affect* the context in which you act, but
7 don't *subject* your choices in any way, whereas Cases 4 and 5 clearly do. But on
8 what basis are we drawing the distinction? For the Kant–Ripstein view to work,
9 the distinction must be drawn with the account of 'subjection' we have recon-
10 structed. But it doesn't look like it can. In Cases 1, 2 and 3, I clearly have the
11 unhindered capacity to unilaterally interfere with your choices—i.e., make things
12 worse for you than they would have been had I lacked this capacity. This
13 capacity is sufficient to get you to take the long route in each case, which you
14 otherwise wouldn't have taken. By potentially accosting, staring, photographing,
15 drenching, and kneecapping you, I hence deprive you of the power to decide
16 whether or not you will take the short route unhindered; I make myself the
17 'master' of your choices over that option; I make it so that you are unable to
18 choose to walk along the short route without being accosted, stared at, photo-
19 graphed, drenched or kneecapped. According to the account of subjection
20 developed thus far, my actions would thus seem to restrict your freedom in the
21 relevant sense, and therefore be wrong, which in turn entails, on the Kantian
22 view, that a legitimate state would be authorized to prohibit them.

23 What strategies might be available to Ripstein's Kant to resist this unwelcome
24 consequence? One might think that Cases 1, 2 and 3 merely *affect* rather than
25 *subject* your choices because you do not have an antecedent right (as part of a
26 system of rights) to take the short route free of people looking at you, or
27 photographing you, or speaking with you. I only subject your choices when the
28 actions which I would perform were you to take the short route *themselves*
29 violate your innate right to freedom under universal law. But how are those
30 further claim-rights to not being drenched and kneecapped—but not to not being
31 accosted, photographed, and stared at—themselves grounded? Why isn't it a
32 violation of your innate right under universal law to accost, photograph or stare
33 at you, but it is a violation of your innate right to kneecap and throw water on
34 you? In all of those cases, I use your body in ways that you did not authorize.
35 In all of those cases, I make the option of taking the short route unhindered
36 ineligible. In all of those cases, I therefore unilaterally interfere with your choices
37 just as I do when you take the long route and thus avoid my intervention.

38 Perhaps the difference between accosting, staring, photographing on one
39 hand, and drenching and kneecapping on the other is that in the latter 'I stop
40 you from using your body as you see fit' (Ripstein 2009: 46) but not in the
41 former? Can't the difference be captured by the idea that in the first three cases
42 I don't decide for you what is to be done with your body, but in the last two I
43 do? I don't see how this can help. You prefer to use your body in such a way
44 as to prevent its being accosted, just as you would prefer to use your body in

1 such as a way as to prevent its being stared at, photographed, kneecapped or
2 drenched.⁹ Why doesn't your control over how to dispose of your body as a
3 self-directed agent extend to controlling who can stare at it, accost it or
4 photograph it? These distinctions cannot, I am arguing, be grounded solely in an
5 account of freedom as independence. Ripstein himself discusses a version of
6 Case 2. Here's what he says:

7 [Y]ou could not enjoy a right against others looking at you under a
8 universal law, because embodied and motile persons can only avoid
9 bumping into each other by looking where they are going, and so
10 sometimes at each other.

11 Let us grant that there can be no general right not to be looked at. But that is
12 not what is in question in Case 2. The right in question is a right not to be *stared*
13 at. The same response is not available to block an affirmation of such a right,
14 since it is surely possible for 'motile and embodied persons' to avoid staring.
15 And the response clearly cannot deal with Case 3, or, indeed, 1.¹⁰

16 Finally, it might be objected that the way I have set up the discussion of the
17 cases requires a rejection of the crucial Kantian idea that rights are *relational* (see
18 Ripstein 2009: 21f). For the Kantian, we do not ask what interests are sufficiently
19 strong or weighty enough to warrant holding another under a duty to promote
20 that interest. We also do not ask directly what individual liberties we ought to
21 protect, and then see how to balance them against other people's liberties.
22 Rather, rights are identified only as a part of a *system* of rights that defines
23 constraints on the conduct of others. In the Kantian framework, you only have
24 those rights to use the means available to you consistent with everyone else's
25 entitlement to do the same with their means. Kantian rights are therefore not
26 rights simply to use your means, which then stand in potential conflict with
27 someone else's rights. Like the property of being an uncle, the property of
28 having a right is non-comparatively relational: just as there is no such thing as
29 an uncle without the children of one's siblings, there is no such thing as a right
30 without a *system* of rights. So when, in glossing the cases above, I say 'I make
31 myself the master of your choices over the option of taking the short route
32 unhindered; I make it so that you are unable to choose to walk along the short
33 route without being accosted, stared at, photographed, drenched or kneecapped',
34 I seem to be presupposing an account of moral rights that Ripstein rejects. The
35 reason is that I seem to be assuming that there is some right, say, *to walk along*
36 *the short route unhindered*, that needs to be *balanced* with another right, say, *to take*
37 *photographs without prior permission* (a nonrelational view). Or I seem to be
38 assuming that there is some right, *to walk along the short route unhindered*, that
39 needs to be compared with, or ranked in relation to, some other right, say, *to take*
40 *photographs without prior permission*, in terms of whether one or the other contains
41 more 'subjection' (a comparatively relational account). But the Kantian view
42 rejects both views.¹¹

43 The objection doesn't succeed because nothing in the setup of the cases—or
44 in the demand to provide a non-question-begging account of subjection—

presupposes such a nonrelational or comparatively relational account of rights. We can easily put the cases and our queries in more explicitly non-comparatively relational terms. The Kantian says that the specific content of rights to use the means at one's disposal (in our case, the use of our body) have to be determined as part of a consistent set or system of rights, such that each person has the same rights as every other. So we ask: What determines the contours of that (non-comparatively relational) space of rights? What criteria do we use to determine what count as your means, and what count as mine, or what count as permissible uses of your means, and what count as permissible uses of mine? The Kantian responds: The idea of independence (and its opposite, subjection) provides a standpoint from which to draw the contours of that (noncomparatively relational) space. The specific (noncomparatively relational) rights that people have (to permissible uses of their means, or to the means themselves) must be understood, that is, as flowing from a more general right to independence from another's choices. That further right does not provide a third 'quantity' or 'dimension' against which rights should be compared (in the same way as 'height', say, is the underlying comparative dimension according to which things counts as taller or shorter than other things), but provides a *set of criteria or principles or standards* for the determination of those rights. The cases then pose this challenge to the Kantian: Do rights not to be accosted, drenched, photographed, kneecapped form part of the consistent set of (noncomparatively relational) rights? Does the best account of subjection available to the Kantian help us to determine whether they do? As should be clear by now, nothing in the setup—or in the argument showing why the idea of subjection (as reconstructed) cannot provide answers to these questions—assumes a nonrelational or comparatively relational account of rights.

A summary of the argument may be useful. We began this section by wondering how we are to draw the crucial distinction between *subjecting* and *affecting* someone's choices. We then considered whether Ripstein's official view, which glossed the notion of subjection in terms of *usurping* and *destroying* another's capacity to set and pursue ends, could aid us in drawing the distinction. I then argued that it could not: *usurping* means *illegitimately* taking control of another's powers, or taking control of powers that are *rightfully* another's. The idea of usurping someone's powers, therefore, cannot be used to explain what actions count as violating someone's enforceable moral rights (within a system of such rights) because it presupposes them. To remedy this defect, we reconstructed the Kantian conception of subjection in terms of a modified republican account of nondomination. According to this conception, I subject your choices if and only if, and because, either (a) I have the unhindered capacity to unilaterally interfere with your choices, and the mere presence or active exercise of that capacity raises the probability that you will behave in ways you otherwise would not have behaved, or (b) I have the unhindered capacity to destroy your ability to set ends. We then saw that this modified view, while more promising than the first, also cannot successfully draw the desired distinction between affecting and subjecting choices without appealing to ideas other than independ-

1 but I believe that there are plausible accounts of interference that use nonmoralized,
2 contextually determined baselines to determine what counts as making someone 'worse
3 off'.

4 ⁶ See the excellent piece, Carter 2008, to which I am much indebted.

5 ⁷ For a different, and very helpful, comparison between Kant and Pettit, see Hodgson
6 2010.

7 ⁸ Other examples of this general kind could also be marshalled for the innate right to
8 be 'beyond reproach' as well.

9 ⁹ Another example could help us to make the same point: Imagine I can control your
10 cortisol levels remotely via some sort of radio waves. By raising and lowering your
11 cortisol levels, and hence your perceived levels of fear and stress, I can get you to do take
12 the short route rather than the long route. This clearly should count as violating the innate
13 right to freedom, if anything does, but in what sense does it prevent you from disposing
14 of your body as you see fit? How is it different (in the relevant sense) from my
15 photographing, or staring at, or speaking to you?

16 ¹⁰ In a footnote Ripstein discusses a variant in which the 'leering' is rightly deemed
17 anticipatory of some sort of assault, but that is has explicitly been excluded in the
18 description of Case 2.

19 ¹¹ I owe this objection to Arthur Ripstein.

20 ¹² I would like to thank Katrin Flikschuh, Pablo Gilabert, Arthur Ripstein, Annie Stilz,
21 and Leif Wenar for very helpful written comments on previous drafts of this paper.

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
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
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


Strikes a line through text and opens up a text box where replacement text can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Replace \(Ins\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type the replacement text into the blue box that appears.

standard framework for the analysis of microeconomics. Nevertheless, it also led to the emergence of a new paradigm of strategic behavior. The number of competitors in the industry is that the structure of the industry is a key component of the main components of the industry. At the level, are expected to be important works on the industry by Shiraz (M henceforth) we open the 'black b



2. Strikethrough (Del) Tool – for deleting text.



Strikes a red line through text that is to be deleted.

How to use it

- Highlight a word or sentence.
- Click on the [Strikethrough \(Del\)](#) icon in the Annotations section.

there is no room for extra profits and the number of competitors are zero and the number of (net) values are not determined by Blanchard and ~~Kiyotaki~~ (1987), perfect competition in general equilibrium. The effects of aggregate demand and supply in the classical framework assuming monopoly are an exogenous number of firms

3. Add note to text Tool – for highlighting a section to be changed to bold or italic.



Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box where comments can be entered.

How to use it

- Highlight the relevant section of text.
- Click on the [Add note to text](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Type instruction on what should be changed regarding the text into the yellow box that appears.

dynamic responses of mark ups consistent with the **VAR** evidence

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4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at specific points in the text.




Marks a point in the proof where a comment needs to be highlighted.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add sticky note](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click at the point in the proof where the comment should be inserted.
- Type the comment into the yellow box that appears.

and supply shocks. Most of the number of competitors and the impact is that the structure of the sector



USING e-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION


5. Attach File Tool – for inserting large amounts of text or replacement figures.




Inserts an icon linking to the attached file in the appropriate place in the text.

How to use it

- Click on the [Attach File](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Click on the proof to where you'd like the attached file to be linked.
- Select the file to be attached from your computer or network.
- Select the colour and type of icon that will appear in the proof. Click OK.



6. Add stamp Tool – for approving a proof if no corrections are required.




Inserts a selected stamp onto an appropriate place in the proof.

How to use it

- Click on the [Add stamp](#) icon in the Annotations section.
- Select the stamp you want to use. (The [Approved](#) stamp is usually available directly in the menu that appears).
- Click on the proof where you'd like the stamp to appear. (Where a proof is to be approved as it is, this would normally be on the first page).

of the business cycle, starting with the
 on perfect competition, constant ret
 production. In this environment goods
 extra profits and the market for marke
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 otaki (1987), has introduced produc
 general equilibrium models with nomin
 and market-clearing. Most of this literat

APPROVED




7. Drawing Markups Tools – for drawing shapes, lines and freeform annotations on proofs and commenting on these marks.

Allows shapes, lines and freeform annotations to be drawn on proofs and for comment to be made on these marks..

How to use it

- Click on one of the shapes in the [Drawing Markups](#) section.
- Click on the proof at the relevant point and draw the selected shape with the cursor.
- To add a comment to the drawn shape, move the cursor over the shape until an arrowhead appears.
- Double click on the shape and type any text in the red box that appears.



For further information on how to annotate proofs, click on the [Help](#) menu to reveal a list of further options:

